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BANKRUPTCY-CHAPTER 13-BIFURCATION OF UNDERSECURED
CLAIMS SECURED ONLY BY RESIDENTIAL REAL ESTATE MORTGAGES
Is NOT ALLOWED. Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In re
Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobelman),' the
United States Supreme Court resolved a split among the United
States Circuit Courts of Appeal concerning whether a debtor who
files for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy
Code2 can bifurcate a claim arising out of a mortgage secured only
by her home into a secured claim for the amount of the collateral's
fair market value and an unsecured claim for the excess of the
amount due under the terms of the loan over the fair market value.3
In Nobelman, the Supreme Court held that section 1322(b)(2) of
the Bankruptcy Code4 prohibits the bifurcation generally allowed by
section 506(a)5 in a Chapter 13 plan if the claim the debtor seeks
to bifurcate is secured only by an interest in residential real property
that comprises her principal residence. 6
In general, Chapter 13 allows an individual with regular income7
to obtain a discharge of nearly all her debts' while retaining most
1. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
It should be noted for research purposes that the Nobelmans' name was misspelled
in both the District Court's and the Fifth Circuit's deciskons as "Nobleman."
2. "Bankruptcy Code" refers to the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 as
amended and codified in 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988). "Chapter 13" refers to
11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1330 (1988).
3. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2109.
4. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988). Section 1322(b)(2) provides: "[T]he plan may
... modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim secured
only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence,
or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the rights of holders of
any class of claims ... ." Id.
5. Id. § 506(a). Section 506(a) provides:
An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which
the estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value
of such creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property . . . and
is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest
• * . is less than the amount of such allowed claim.
Id. 11 U.S.C. § 103 (1988) provides that Chapters 1, 3, and 5 are applicable to
Chapter 13 cases.
6. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
7. "Only an individual with regular income.. . may be a debtor under Chapter
13 of this title. . . ." 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1988).
8. "As soon as practicable after completion by the debtor of all payments
under the plan . . . the court shall grant the debtor a discharge of all debts provided
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of her assets. 9 To obtain such relief, a Chapter 13 debtor must
voluntarily 0 file a debt restructuring plan." The plan must provide
for payments out of the future earnings of the debtor for a period
of three to five years.' 2 Secured creditors are generally paid in full
up to the value of their claims, and unsecured creditors are paid
a sum at least equal to the amount they would receive under a
Chapter 7 liquidation.' 3 If the bankruptcy court confirms the plan,
then a debtor who makes all payments under the plan obtains a
discharge of all debts provided for in the plan except for debts for
which the last payment was due after the completion of the plan
or debts owed for alimony, maintenance and support obligations,
student loans, or injury to another from driving under the influence
of intoxicants.' 4 For a Chapter 13 plan to be confirmed, the debtor
must convince the holders of each allowed fully secured claim to
accept the plan, provide for payments under the plan equal to the
value of such claim, and allow the creditor to either retain her lien
securing the claim, or surrender the property securing it to the
creditor. 1I
In structuring her Chapter 13 plan, the debtor may generally
bifurcate the claims of undersecured creditors. Bifurcation 6 is the
for by the plan." Id. § 1328(a).
One of the incentives for filing a Chapter 13 plan as opposed to Chapter 7 or
11 is the so-called superdischarge available under Chapter 13. Under Chapters 7
and 11, many types of debt are nondischargeable. See id. § 502. In a Chapter 13
bankruptcy, however, virtually all of the debtor's debts are dischargeable. See id.
§ 1328.
9. Unless the plan or the order confirming the plan provides otherwise, the
confirmation of a plan vests in the debtor all of the property of the estate free
and clear of any claim or interest of any creditor provided for in the plan. Id.
§§ 1306(b), 1327(b)-(c). However, a debtor may surrender secured property to a
creditor in lieu of paying her the value of her claim. Id. § 1325(a)(5)(C).
10. Involuntary provisions are not possible under Chaptcr 13. See id. § 1-0-3(a).
11. Id. § 1321. "The debtor shall file a plan." Id.
12. Id. § 1322(a)(1), (c). Because a plan must be proposed in good faith to be
confirmed, the debtor must usually specify that all her disposable income be applied
to payment of the creditors under the plan. Id. § 1325(a)(3). Bankruptcy plans
normally span a three year period, but the court may approve a plan for up to
five years. Id. § 1322(c).
13. The plan may provide for the partial or full payment of unsecured creditors
out of future wages or other income of the debtor over a three to five year period.
Id. § 1322(a), (c). Under the Nobelmans' plan, the unsecured creditors would have
received nothing. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct.
2106, 2109 (1993).
14. 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1988). The key to a Chapter 13 bankruptcy is confirmation
of the plan pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1325. Once a plan is confirmed, the provisions
bind the debtor and each creditor regardless of whether the claim of the creditor
is provided for in the plan, and whether or not the creditor has objected to, has
accepted, or has rejected the plan. Id. § 1327(a).
15. Id. § 1325(a)(5).
16. While bifurcation is the terminology used by the Supreme Court, other
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process described in section 506(a) through which a creditor's
undersecured17 claim is split into two separate claims: a secured claim
for the amount of the value of the collateral and an unsecured
claim for the amount of the excess due under the note over the
value of the collateral.' 8 The debtor's plan may then provide for a
discharge of the unsecured portion of the debt for only a percentage
of the amount due.' 9
Creditors whose claims are secured only by an interest in the
debtor's primary residence, however, enjoy a measure of protection
against bifurcation under section 1322(b)(2). 20 The interpretation of
the scope of this protection resulted in a split among the circuits.
Four circuits held that the scope of protection under section 1322(b)(2)
was narrow and allowed bifurcation of the claims for undersecured
home mortgages. 2' In Nobelman, however, the Fifth Circuit held
that the protection granted by that section was broad enough to
prohibit the bifurcation of claims secured only by home mortgages. 2
The Supreme Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit view and affirmed
the circuit court's decision in Nobelman that the scope of protection
provided by section 1322(b)(2) included protection from bifurcation
under section 506.23
courts have referred to the process as "cram down," "lien stripping," and "strip
down."
17. "Undersecured" means that the market value of the collateral is less than
the obligation that the collateral secures. See United Say. Ass'n v. Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc. (In re Timbers of Inwood Assoc.), 793 F.2d 1380, 1381 (5th
Cir. 1986).
18. 11 U.S.C. § 506 (1988).
19. Id. § 1322.
20. In his concurring opinion in Nobelman v. American Exchange Bank (In re
Nobelman), 113 S.Ct. 2106 (1993), Justice Stevens pointed out that:
At first blush it seems somewhat strange that the Bankruptcy Code
should provide less protection to an individual's interest in retaining pos-
session of his or her home than of other assets. The anomaly is, however,
explained by the legislative history indicating that favorable treatment of
residential mortgagees was intended to encourage the flow of capital into
the home lending market.
Id. at 211-12. (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
21. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy), 962
F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re Hart), 923 F.2d
1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp., 895 F.2d 123
(3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland), 886 F.2d
1182 (9th Cir. 1989); see also Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman),
113 S. Ct. 2106, 2109 n.2 (1993).
22. Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 489
(5th Cir. 1992).
23. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
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II. FACTS
Leonard and Harriet Nobelman borrowed $68,250 from Amer-
ican Savings Bank (hereinafter "American") on July 21, 1984, to
purchase a condominium in Dallas, Texas. 4 The note was secured
by the condominium, 25 which was the Nobelmans' principal resi-
dence. 26 On August 6, 1990, the Nobelmans voluntarily filed a petition
for bankruptcy under Chapter 13.27 American filed a proof of claim28
for $71,355.04 with the bankruptcy court which included the prin-
cipal, interest, and fees owed on the note.29 The Chapter 13 plan
proposed by the Nobelmans would have bifurcated American's claim
into a secured portion equal to the fair market value of the property
and an unsecured portion which, under the plan, would be discharged
without payment.3 0 Under the Nobelmans' plan, American would
have received only $23,500 plus prepetition arrearages as payment
for its secured claim, but the Nobelmans would have kept their
condominium and enjoyed a discharge of the remainder of the debt. 3'
The Nobelmans asserted that 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) authorized the
reduction of American's secured claim to the fair market value of
the property, $23,500.32
American and the Chapter 13 trustee objected to the Nobelmans'
plan and argued that 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) prohibited the bifur-
cation since it impermissibly modified Americans' rights as a holder
of a claim secured only by real property comprising the debtor's
24. Id. at 2108.
25. The note was also secured by a security interest in an undivided .67%'o
interest in the common areas of the condominium complex, escrow funds, proceeds
of hazard insurance, and rents. Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman),
129 B.R. 98, 99 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). The Supreme Court, however, did not
discuss this additional security, and therefore did not definitively establish whether
a note such as this even qualifies for the protection § 1322(b)(2) offers. See Hammond
v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. of Am., 156 B.R. 943 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993),
for a complete discussion of the effect of the Nobelman decision on Third Circuit
precedents holding that any interest other than residential real property is sufficient
to remove a claim from the ambit of § 1322(b)(2)'s protection.
26. Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99.
27. Id.
28. A proof of claim is a sworn statement filed in a bankruptcy proceeding
by a creditor that sets forth the amount of and basis for the claim. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1215 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99.
30. Id.
31. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2108-
09 (1993).
32. This amount was uncontroverted at trial. Id. at 2108-09.
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principal residence.33 The bankruptcy court agreed and refused to
confirm the plan. 34 The District Court for the Northern District of
Texas,"5 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit,3 6
and the Supreme Court of the United States affirmed.1
III. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The United States Constitution expressly grants Congress the
power to establish Bankruptcy laws.38 Pursuant to this power, Con-
gress enacted the Bankrupty Act of 1898.19 When that Act proved
insufficient to cope with emerging problems, Congress appointed the
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States. 40 After
considering the advice of the Commission, Congress enacted the
current version of the Bankruptcy Code in 1978 .4
The language of section 1322(b)(2)42 of the Bankruptcy Code
as enacted by Congress represents a compromise agreement between
the House and Senate versions of this section.4 3 The House's original
version of section 1322(b)(2) would have allowed a Chapter 13 plan
to modify the rights of holders of secured and unsecured claims.4
The Senate's version would have prevented the modification of all
claims secured only by mortgages on real property. 4 The version
finally enacted and currently in effect is the result of a number of
33. Nobleman, 129 B.R. at 99.
34. Id. at 99.
35. Id. at 104.
36. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483, 489
(5th Cir. 1992).
37. Nobelman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2111
(1993).
38. "The Congress shall have Power to ... establish ... uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 8, cl. 4.
39. The National Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, amended by
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549.
40. Klee, Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 DEPAuL L. REv.
941, 942-43 (1979).
41. Id.
42. See supra note 4.
43. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963. ("Section 1322(b)(2) of the House amendment represents a
compromise agreement between similar provisions in the House bill and Senate
amendment. Under the House amendment, the plan may modify the rights of
holders of secured claims other than a claim secured by a security interest in real
property that is the debtor's principal residence.")
44. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
45. S. 2266, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
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floor amendments agreed upon by both houses.6 Although the leg-
islative history clearly shows that section 1322(b)(2) was a compromise
between sharply contrasting proposals, it does not clearly express
the intent of Congress in enacting the current statutory language
regarding bifurcation of claims secured by home mortgages.4 7 It is
this lack of clarity in both the statutory text and the legislative
history that led to the split in the circuit courts of appeals" that
the Supreme Court resolved in Nobelman. a
A. The Majority View: Bifurcation of Claims Arising Out of
Undersecured Home Mortgages Was Allowed.
Prior to Nobelman, the majority view was that bifurcation of
claims arising from undersecured home mortgages was not prohibited
by section 1322(b)(2).49 This view was first adopted at the Court of
Appeals level by the Ninth Circuit in Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton
Co. (In Re Hougland).50 The rationale behind the Hougland decision
was followed by many of the courts adopting this view, and it
accurately portrays what was the majority's stance.
The court in Hougland employed a technical, grammatical analysis
in interpreting section 1322(b)(2)." According to the Hougland court,
46. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir.
1984).
47. Nobleman v. American Sav. Bank (In re Nobleman), 129 B.R. 98, 103
(Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991). For a complete discussion of the legislative history of
§ 1322(b)(2) and the possible interpretations thereof, see Grubbs, 730 F.2d 236;
Goins v. Diamond Mortgage Corp., 119 B.R. 156 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1990); Mark
S. Scarberry & Scott M. Reddie, Home Mortgage Strip Down in Chapter 13
Bankruptcy: A Contextual Approach to Sections 1322(b)(2) and (b)(5), 20 PEPP.
L. REv. 425 (1993); Erik D. Klingenberg, Strip Down of Home Mortgages: Un-
dressing 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2), 66 ST. JoHN's L. Rv. 443 (1992).
48. The Fifth Circuit held that bifurcation of undersecured home mortgages
was prohibited. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483
(5th Cir. 1992). Four other circuits had held that bifurcation of undersecured home
mortgages was allowed. See Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In
re Bellamy), 962 F.2d 176 (2d Cir. 1992); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart (In re
Hart), 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991); Wilson v. Commonwealth Mortgage Corp.,
895 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1990); Hougland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Hougland),
886 F.2d 1182 (9th Cir. 1989).
49. The Second, Third, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits followed this approach. See
Bellamy, 962 F.2d 176; Wilson, 895 F.2d 123; Hougland, 886 F.2d 1182; Hart,
923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991). Several bankruptcy and district courts in other
circuits also agreed with this position. See, e.g., Richards v. Citicorp Mortgage,
Inc., 151 B.R. 8 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1993); In re Jones, 152 B.R. 155 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1993); Franklin v. Union Mortgage Co., 126 B.R. 702 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
1991); In re Gadson, 114 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1990); In re DeMoff, 109
B.R. 902 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1989).
50. Houghland v. Lomas & Nettleton Co. (In re Houghland), 886 F.2d 1182
(9th Cir. 1989).
51. Id. at 1183-84.
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it is the textual language of the statute itself that defines the search
for statutory meaning.52 The court noted that there was no real need
to consult the legislative history because the statute is internally
consistent and can be interpreted without extrinsic aids." The
Hougland court also determined that, even if the legislative history
is consulted, it only warrants the narrow and ambiguous inference
that Congress intended to provide some benefit to residential real
estate lenders . 4
In interpreting the language of section 1322(b)(2), the first step
the Hougland court took was to try to define "secured claim" and
"unsecured claim" since these terms were at the heart of the
controversy." The court held that the terms "secured claim" and
"unsecured claim" in section 1322(b)(2) should carry the meaning
ascribed to them by section 506(a) 6 because section 506 is a definitional
section that applies to Chapter 13 cases. 57 Section 506(a) limits a
secured claim to the value of the collateral securing the lien and
treats the remainder as an unsecured claim .5 The court then applied
these definitions to the terms as they are used in section 1322(b)(2)
and concluded that the clear language of the statute allows bifurcation
of claims arising from home mortgages. 59
According to the Hougland court, the clause in section 1322(b)(2)
that provides "other than a claim secured only by a security interest
in real property that is the debtor's principal residence" (hereinafter
the "other than" clause)60 logically modifies "secured claim" since
that is the closest referent. 61 The court determined that, given the
structure of the section, it would be most unusual if the "other
52. "[T]he quest for meaning should begin and end 'with the language of the
statute itself.' " Id. at 1183 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 109 S. Ct.
1026, 1030 (1989)).
53. "[S]ince ... the statute is internally consistent and can be construed without
the use of outside aids, there is no real need to concentrate on the legislative
history." Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185. It should be noted that some of the other
courts of appeals' decisions addressing this issue did look to the legislative history
to determine legislative intent, but found no indication of the proper interpretation
from that history. See, e.g., Bellamy, 962 F.2d at 181-82.
54. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1185.
55. Id. at 1183.
56. Id. at 1183 (quoting United States v. Ron Pair Enter., 109 S. Ct. 1026,
1029 (1989)). Section 506(a) applies to Chapter 13 proceedings. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) (1988).
57. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1183-84.
58. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (1988).
59. For the text of § 1322(b)(2) see supra note 4.
60. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1988).
61. Hougland, 886 F.2d at 1184.
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than" clause modified either "unsecured claim" or the whole
sentence.62 The court held that the use of commas to set apart the
"other than" clause did not affect its decision.6 3
The Hougland court also found support for its interpretation
in reading the statute as a whole." According to the court, its
interpretation avoids the conflict that inevitably arises between section
1322(b)(2) and section 506(a) from any other interpretation. 65 In fact,
the court held that it was bound to read the sections in such a way
that, if possible, they would be harmonious when read in the context
of the whole statute."
While the Hougland court did not address public policy issues,
it is possible that policy considerations influenced its decision. Other
courts adopting the majority view were also, presumably, motivated
by policy concerns. Although the circuit courts' decisions did not
specifically discuss these policy concerns, the courts hinted at such
concerns by discussing the broad policy of the "fresh start" goals
of Chapter 13.67 These policy concerns are grounded in the idea
that it simply is not fair to deny bifurcation since it will result in
the secured creditor being paid as much or more than she would
receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation." In fact, if bifurcation were not
allowed, it is possible that the Chapter 13 debtor would simply
abandon her homestead. 69 The creditor would then have to obtain
relief from the automatic stay and foreclose on the property.70 The
creditor would, presumably, only be able to sell the property for,
at most, its fair market value, and the resulting defi*ciency would
be unsecured.7' The debtor would then include the unsecured claim
in his Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan and obtain a discharge.7 2 Under
this scenario, the creditor would receive the same payment as if
62. Id. at 1184.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See, e.g., Bellamy v. Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (In re Bellamy),
962 F.2d 176, 181 (2d Cir. 1992).
68. See David A. Wisniewski, Note, Residential Mortgages Under Chapter 13
of the Bankruptcy Code: The Increasing Case Against Cramdown After Dewsnup
v. Timm, 46 VAND. L. REv. 1031 (1993).
69. Brief on the Merits for Petitioners, Leonard Nobelman and Harriet Nobelman
at 1, Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993)
(No. 92-641).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
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bifurcation were allowed, but the debtor loses his home. 73
Undoubtedly, many courts found this result unpalatable.
B. The Minority View: Section 1322(b)(2) Prohibited the
Bifurcation of Claims Arising From Undersecured Home
Mortgages into Secured and Unsecured Claims.
Until Nobelman,7 4 no court of appeals had adopted the view
that section 1322(b)(2) prohibited the bifurcation of a claim arising
from an undersecured home mortgage into secured and unsecured
components. Several bankruptcy courts, however, had adopted this
interpretation. 75 These courts rejected the majority position as an
"overly technocratic" approach to analyzing the text of sections
1322(b)(2) and (b)(5), and relating it to section 506(a). 76 In In re
Kaczmarczyk,77 the court discussed four basic rationales used by the
courts adopting the minority's interpretation of section 1322(b)(2).
One rationale, employed by the court in Kaczmarczyk, is that
the non-bifurcation construction is more consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code's historical treatment of secured claims. 78 Under
the Bankruptcy Code's predecessor, the Bankruptcy Act, a Chapter
13 plan could not deal with any claim secured by an estate in real
property. 79 Because the Bankruptcy Code was enacted against this
background, the court concluded that the basic rule that a claim
73. Id. See also Wisniewski, supra note 68.
74. Nobleman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 968 F.2d 483 (5th
Cir. 1992).
75. See, e.g., In re Hernandez, 149 B.R. 441 (Bankr. E.D. Tex. 1993); In re
Vines, 153 B.R. 345 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1993); In re Strober, 136 B.R. 614 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1992); United Co. Fin. Corp. v. Davis, 148 B.R. 16 (Bankr. W.D. La.
1992); In re Doss, 143 B.R. 952 (Bankr. E.D. Okla. 1992); In re Davidoff, 136
B.R. 567 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992); In re Burgess, 138 B.R. 56 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1991); In re Etchin, 128 B.R. 662 (Bankr. W.D. Wisc. 1991); In re Hynson, 66
B.R. 246 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1986). This view seems to be the approach taken by the
bankruptcy courts in the Eighth Circuit. See In re Hussman, 133 B.R. 490 (Bankr.
D. Minn. 1991); In re Sauber, 115 B.R. 197 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990); In re
Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989); and In re Russell, 93 B.R.
703 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
76. Sauber, 115 B.R. at 199. The court also criticized the approach taken by
the Ninth Circuit in Hougland saying, "[a]lthough ostensibly undertaken in search
of the plain meaning of these statutes, that meaning, and the proper setting of
the statutes in the context of the overall scheme of the Code, is as clearly missed
as the proverbial forest might be missed in examining the trees." Id.
77. In re Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. 200 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1989).
78. Id. at 202.
79. Id. at 202-03.
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secured by real property cannot be dealt with under the plan continues
except as explicitly changed by the Bankruptcy Code.80 Because
Congress did not explicitly change the treatment of claims secured
by a mortgage on the debtor's principal residence, the court concluded
that Congress intended a continuity of treatment.8 1 This led the court
to the conclusion that section 1322(b)(2) prohibits the bifurcation
of home mortgages.8 2
A second rationale used by some courts in holding that the
bifurcation of claims secured only by home mortgages is forbidden
is that the legislative history indicates that Congress intended to
prohibit such bifurcation.8 3 These decisions focus on the compromise
between the House and Senate bills 4 They hold that the compromise
prohibits a Chapter 13 plan from modifying claims secured only by
the debtor's principal residence, but does not specifically limit the
protection to a secured claim.85
A third rationale is that the plain meaning of section 1322(b)(2)
prohibits the bifurcation." The plain language of the statute prohibits
the modification of a claim secured only by a debtor's principal
residence.87 The Bankruptcy Code, in section 101(5)(a),8 1 defines a
claim as the right to payment whether secured or unsecured.8 9 Since
the claim referred to in section 1322(b)(2) can be either secured or
unsecured, the protection extends to even undersecured mortgages. 9°
The fourth rationale employed by courts in holding that section
1322(b)(2) controls over section 506(a) is ejusdem generis, a tenet
of statutory construction. 91 The application of this tenet to section
506(a), which is general in nature, and section 1322(a)(2), which is
specific, would dictate that, if there is a conflict between the two
sections, section 1322(b)(2) controls. 92 Therefore, bifurcation of the
claim secured by the debtor's home mortgage is prohibited. 93
80. Id. at 203.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 202.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. In re Russell, 93 B.R. 703, 705 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1988).
88. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(a) (1994).
89. Russell, 93 B.R. at 705.
90. Id.
91. See Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. at 202. Ejusdem generis is a canon of statutory
construction which dictates that, if there is both general and specific language that
conflicts but seems applicable to a given situation, the specific language governs.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 517 (6th ed. 1990).
92. Kaczmarczyk, 107 B.R. at 202.
93. Id.
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE COURT IN NOBELMAN
In Nobelman v. American Savings Bank (In re Nobelman), 94
the United States Supreme Court resolved the issue of whether
undersecured claims secured only by an interest in the real property
comprising the debtor's principal residence may be bifurcated into
secured and unsecured claims pursuant to section 506(a) and modified
with respect to the unsecured portion under section 1322. 95 The Court
decided that such bifurcation is prohibited by section 1322(b)(2)
based primarily on a literal grammatical analysis of the distinction
between "rights" and "claims.'' 96
American argued that the plan proposed by the Nobelmans
impermissibly modified its rights as a homestead mortgagee. 97 The
Nobelmans claimed that their plan did not modify American's rights
because those rights are defined by the status of the claim as
determined by section 506(a). 98 The Court held that the proper
application of section 506(a) is to determine whether the creditor
holds a secured claim.99 The fact that a portion of the creditor's
claim is thus rendered unsecured does not mean that the protected
rights of the creditor are limited by the value of its secured claim.' °°
Instead, the Court held that if a creditor holds a claim that is
secured only by an interest in the debtor's principal residence, even
if it is undersecured, all of the creditor's contractual rights are
protected.'10
The Court turned to state law to determine what rights American
possessed that were protected by section 1322(b)(2).102 The rights
that the Court held to be protected included the rights: To have
the principal paid back over a fixed term in monthly installments
bearing specified rates of interest; to keep its lien on the property
until the debtor pays in full; to accelerate the maturity of the loan
upon default; to foreclose and sell; and to recover any deficiency
remaining after the foreclosure. 0 3 The Court held that these rights
could not be modified by the Chapter 13 plan.' °4
94. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106 (1993).
95. Id. at 2106.
96. Id. at 2110.
97. Id. at 2109.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 2110.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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In reaching this decision, the Court rejected the grammatical
analysis used by the court in Hougland.0 5 The Court acknowledged
that the interpretation given by the Hougland court "is quite sensible
as a matter of grammar."'06 It found, however, that the more
persuasive reading is one that applies the broad definition of claim
set forth in section 101(5),107 which includes secured and unsecured
rights to payment.1m The Court also acknowledged the practical
impossibility of modifying the rights with respect to the unsecured
component without modifying the rights associated with the secured
component as well.' 9 Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that a
debtor cannot bifurcate claims secured by home mortgages in a
Chapter 13 bankruptcy plan." 0
In his concurring opinion, Justice Stevens indicated that the
legislative history of section 1322(b)(2) explained the seemingly bizarre
policy of affording a debtor less protection for his homestead than
for his other assets."' In Justice Stevens's opinion, the legislative
history suggested that Congress afforded the extra protection to
home mortgage lenders to encourage growth in that market." 2
V. SIGNIFCANCE
The most immediate impact of Nobelman v. American Savings
Bank (In re Nobelman) is that it changed the law of bankruptcy
in at least twenty-one states by prohibiting the bifurcation of claims
secured by home mortgages in Chapter 13 bankruptcies." 3 As a
result, the debtors in these jurisdictions considering Chapter 13 may
now find it more difficult to save their homes. Indeed, debtors faced
with a similar situation to that which the Nobelmans encountered
may well opt for a solution like the one the Nobelmans' attorney,
Philip I. Palmer, Jr., foresaw the Nobelmans taking if the Supreme
105. Id. at 2111.
106. Id.
107. 11 U.S.C. § 101(5) (1988 & Supp. III 1993).
108. Nobelman, 113 S. Ct. at 2111.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobelman), 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2111-
12 (1993) (Stevens, J., concurring).
112. Id. at 2112.
113. At least twenty-one states were bound by the circuit court decisions cited
in note 21 including: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York,
Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and Wyoming. See
supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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Court ruled against them. According to the Washington Post, Mr.
Palmer said that in lieu of paying $71,000 for a condominium worth
$23,500, "[w]e will wheel Mr. Nobelman out in the hall, buy the
vacant [condo] next door for $23,500 and move him back in.""14
Such an extreme solution is, however, not the debtor's only
alternative. While Nobelman prohibits bifurcation in Chapter 13
cases, and although another recent Supreme Court opinion prohibits
bifurcation in Chapter 7 cases," 5 there has not been a definitive
Supreme Court ruling on whether it is allowed in Chapter 11 cases. 16
Michael S. Polk, a bankruptcy attorney who represents mortgage
companies, said that he "anticipates a rise in the more cumbersome
and expensive Chapter 11 filings as a last resort for cramdowns. 117
If this view is correct, bifurcation seems to still be a viable alternative
in Chapter 11 cases.
Nobelman also does not completely foreclose the possibility of
a debtor's use of bifurcation in some Chapter 13 cases. Neither
section 1322(b)(2) nor the Nobelman decision prohibits the modi-
fication of the rights of a creditor when the creditor has a security
interest in collateral other than the debtor's principal residence." 8
Although the Nobelmans' lien was secured by more than just their
residence," 9 the Supreme Court did not specifically address this issue.
At least one court has refused to apply Nobelman in a case where
the note was also secured by appliances and fixtures.' 20 Before
Nobelman was decided, some courts held that rents and profits were
enough to remove a claim from the ambit of section 1322(b)(2).' 2'
Whether these distinctions will hold up in light of Nobelman remains
to be seen.
114. H. Jane Lehman, Mortgage Reduction Issue Still Alive Despite Ruling,
Cramdowns Possible for Some Bankrupt Homeowners, THE WASHINGTON POST,
June 5, 1993, at Fl.
115. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773 (1992).
116. Although the Supreme Court has not decided whether bifurcation of claims
secured only by the debtor's primary residence is allowed in Chapter 11, some
lower courts have held that such bifurcation is allowed in Chapter 11 cases. See,
e.g., Deever v. Internal Revenue Serv. (In re Deever), Adv. No. LA-92-03426-LF,
1994 WL 43906, (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 1994); In re Kennedy, 158 B.R. 589
(Bankr. D.N.J. 1993).
117. H. Jane Lehman, Court Deals Setback to Bankrupt Homeowners 'Cram-
downs' Reduce Mortgage to Property Value, LA TIMEs, June 13, 1993, at KI.
118. 5 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 1322.06, at 1322-16 (L. King 15th ed. 1989).
119. See supra note 25.
120. Hammond v. Commonwealth Mortgage Co. of Am., 156 B.R. 943 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 1993).
121. See, e.g., Sapos v. Provident Inst. of Say., 967 F.2d 918, 925 (3d Cir.
1992).
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Another question that Nobelman leaves unanswered is whether
a completely undersecured lien can be modified by a Chapter 13
plan. The Court in Nobelman held that it was proper to apply
section 506(a) to determine the status of a claim as secured or
unsecured. 22 This language strongly suggests that a completely un-
dersecured claim is thus an unsecured claim and, as such, can be
modified in a Chapter 13 plan.'2 Therefore, bifurcation seems to
still be available in many Chapter 13 plans as a means of discharging
junior liens that are completely undersecured.
Critics of the holding in Nobelman warn that it may result in
more undersecured loans being made to unsophisticated debtors since
the creditors will depend on the leverage that foreclosure gives them
to obtain repayment in the event of bankruptcy. According to Henry
J. Sommer, a Philadelphia lawyer who represents low-income clients,
about ten to twenty percent of all second mortgages are currently
undersecured, but that number is expected to rise in light of the
Nobelman decision.'
Supporters of the decision envision that the true significance of
Nobelman lies in what its holding prevented: more expensive mort-
gages. The executive vice president of the Mortgage Bankers As-
sociation of America, Warren Lasko, said that a contrary decision
would have meant that lenders would have had to price everybody's
mortgages higher to make up for the potential losses that bifurcation
would have caused. 25
Both positions recognize that Nobelman has the potential to
substantially affect bankruptcy practice and the residential lending
industry. Although the Supreme Court left many loopholes for
debtors that would permit bifurcation, the decision in Nobelman
has made it substantially more difficult to do so. The net effect of
Nobelman is that, for the most part, home mortgages are not
dischargeable in Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceedings.
Steven 0. Vondran
122. Nobelman v. American Say. Bank (In re Nobleman), 113 S. Ct. 2106, 2108
(1993).
123. COLLIER, supra note 118, 1322.06.
124. Lehman, supra note 114, at Fl.
125. Lehman, supra note 114, at Fl.
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